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Abstract
A duopoly game with timing announcements endogenizes the sequence of commitments.
In duopolistic price competition, endogenous moves lead to a coordination problem with
two non-Pareto ranked subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs). In these SPEs both firms prefer
followership to leadership. We suggest that a unique SPE can be found if firms use partial
commitments to their timing announcements. Using partial commitments, the firms first
announce the timing of moves but reserve the option to deviate from this announcement and
pay a deviation cost. We show that given a sufficient asymmetry in stochastic production
technologies, there exists a unique SPE with sequential moves if the deviation costs are
sufficiently different or if a common deviation cost belongs to a suitable interval. We also
discuss the information sharing implications of the results and find that information is not
shared at the unique SPE.
Keywords Partial commitments · Endogenous timing · Price competition · Cost uncertainty
1 Introduction
Commitment in oligopoly games has been an active research topic since Von Stackelberg
(1934) proposed that a timing asymmetry in the Cournot duopoly model leads to an asym-
metry in equilibrium payoffs even for firms that are symmetric in other ways, e.g. have equal
costs and face the same (inverse) demand function. The Stackelberg solution concept, where
the leader anticipates the follower’s reaction and optimizes own strategy against it, creating
for itself a first mover advantage, has found applications in various areas within and outside
the industrial organization literature. However, the applicability of the Stackelberg solution
concept is limited to situations where the structure that sets the timing of decisions is exoge-
nously given. Even in the case of asymmetric duopolists, the Stackelberg solution concept
does not yield insight into timing and does not answer exactly which firm should move first
and which second.
Relaxing the exogenous timing structure, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) give the firms
the possibility to announce when they commit to their strategies (the “extended game
with observable delay”, henceforth the “HS game”). Timing announcements are made
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simultaneously at Stage 0 of the game. The leader decides at Stage 1 and the follower decides
at Stage 2. The firms are committed to their announcements and the outcome of the game
is decided upon the announcements. Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) important observation
is the dependence of leader/follower preference on the sign of the reaction correspondences.
With decreasing reactions, which are typical in quantity competition, there is simultaneous
play where both announce leadership. With increasing reaction correspondences the players
face a coordination dilemma where the two sequential-move outcomes are preferred over
the simultaneous-move outcomes. The timing problem in the Stackelberg solution concept
is thus partially solved by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), in the case of quantity competition,
suggesting that both firms should announce leadership.
The subsequent literature on endogenous timing games has presented conditions under
which one sequential-move outcome would prevail over the other sequential-move outcome
and the simultaneous-move outcomes. Some examples include differing convexity properties
of the demand functions (Amir and Grilo 1999), informational asymmetries (Normann 2002),
commitment riskiness (Van Damme and Hurkens 1999), and non-monotonicity of reactions
(Hoffmann and Rota Graziosi 2010).
Price competition in duopoly with heterogenous goods forms a clear situation where
the reaction correspondences are increasing and there are two sequential-move equilibria
in nondominated strategies. The payoffs in this game are qualitatively as in the Battle of
the Sexes, where a coordination failure leads to worse payoffs than coordinating on the
least desirable equilibrium outcome. One way to look for a solution to this coordination
dilemma—i.e. which firm should emerge as the leader and which as the follower—is to look
at asymmetries in the technological capabilities of the firms. Amir and Stepanova (2006)
show that when the firms compete in prices and they have sufficient unit production cost
asymmetry, the high cost firm is selected as the follower and the low cost firm as the leader
by a risk dominance argument. This is because the product of deviation losses is larger in the
equilibrium where the high cost firm is the follower than in the other equilibrium. Firms that
are interested in reducing the probability of a coordination failure will pick the risk dominant
equilibrium.
Laboratory evidence enriches the implications of the HS game by suggesting that subjects
play a coordination game even when the strategies are quantities, reaction correspondences
are decreasing and theory predicts simultaneous play (Fonseca et al. 2006). Santos-Pinto
(2008) argues that inequity aversion explains why a coordination game evolves in the game:
an experimentally robust phenomenon, inequity aversion leads to nonmonotonic, rather than
strictly decreasing, reaction correspondences, thus yielding multiple sequential-move equi-
libria on the intersections of the increasing parts of the reaction correspondences rather than
a single simultaneous-move one.
In this paper we aim to resolve the coordination problem that arises when duopolists
compete in prices in the HS game by introducing the idea that a duopolist may deviate from
its announced commitment and pay a cost for doing so if it sees that as a better alternative
than sticking to its commitment. This kind of a commitment is called partial commitment
because it is an intermediary case between full commitment (pay an infinitely large cost from
deviating) and no commitment (do not pay at all from deviating). We show that a unique
equilibrium may be attained in such a situation if the firms have sufficient asymmetry in their
stochastic production technologies.
As a motivating example, think of two market-leading restaurant chains that compete in
prices and contemplate on opening new facilities in the same shopping mall. According to the
HS model, if the firms post their prices on the opening day, they will not announce simulta-
neous opening; each prefers to see the other’s prices first and then enjoy their second-mover
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advantage. Given that the firms may freely choose when to open, a coordination problem
ensues. In this paper we are interested to solve this problem by studying the conditions under
which a unique equilibrium may be attained if one or both restaurant chains can renege on
their announcements and delay their opening, and possibly incur themselves a deviation cost,
for example, in the form of contractual fine or reputational damage in the local market.
The commitment concept that we consider here is that of partial commitments. The player
who makes the partial commitment to leadership (followership) reserves the option to renege
and opt for followership (leadership) instead by paying a finite deviation cost. In that case, the
mere option of deviating from the announced strategy affects equilibrium behavior, because
then the other firm can form rational expectations on the profitability of the competitor’s
deviation and prepare an appropriate reaction. The level of commitment can be parameter-
ized by the choice of the deviation cost: an expensive deviation cost implies a high level of
commitment whereas a cheap deviation cost implies that the level of commitment is low.
Specifying the game in this way makes it possible to inspect the whole continuum of com-
mitment options, from full commitment (infinitely large deviation cost) to cheap talk (zero
deviation cost), and find a level of commitment that yields unique solutions. In our main
result, in the unique SPE the firm with higher expected marginal cost of production becomes
the follower if the deviation cost is common to both firms and suitably chosen.
The idea of partial commitments in strategic decisions dates back to Schelling (1960).
Partial commitments have received interest in the bargaining literature. Muthoo (1996) studies
bargaining with partial commitments and finds that the level of commitment dictates the
equilibrium share of the surplus, and Kambe (1999) extends the results for players who are
patient vs. impatient. Signaling intentions by burning money, which as a concept is close to
partial commitments, has been studied in coordination games e.g. by Ben-Porath and Dekel
(1992).
The literature on partial commitments in duopoly games is narrower. Henkel (2002) and
Weber (2014) consider games with exogenously given timing and find that it is sometimes
profitable for the first mover to renege on its commitment to the leader’s strategy and pay
a deviation cost. We extend the ideas of these papers to the endogenous timing literature.
However, our results differ from Henkel (2002) and Weber (2014) in an important sense,
namely in that the mere option of reneging on the commitment affects the existence of SPEs.
Our paper is closest to Caruana and Einav (2008) who study a partial commitment model
in an endogenous timing game where there are sequential opportunities to commit within
the 0-Stage and each opportunity becomes costlier than the previous one. We discuss how
our model relates to the models of Caruana and Einav (2008) as well as Henkel (2002) and
Weber (2014) in the Discussion section.
In our model the firms have initially stochastic production technologies, represented by
stochastic marginal costs, and leading to the analysis of Bayesian strategies. It is possible
in some applications that this uncertainty is learned privately by each firm before decision
making takes place. It is therefore relevant to also consider how information sharing affects
our results. In the information sharing literature, it is known that the firms’ incentives to share
their private cost information depend on whether they are leaders, followers or simultaneous
movers. However, as the role differentiation is resolved only after the actual decision making
about commitments has taken place, it is relevant to consider the ex-ante information reve-
lation implications. We derive a result where it is always optimal for both firms to conceal
their private marginal costs even for a high deviation cost that favors one firm (the high cost
firm) to become the follower.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we formulate the model without partial commit-
ments and show that the coordination game in timing announcements exists. Then in Sect. 3
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we show that this coordination game can be resolved, i.e. a unique equilibrium attained,
with partial commitments if the firms have asymmetric marginal cost distributions. Section 4
considers the duopolists’ incentives to share their private cost information, and Sect. 5 links
our results to existing literature on partial commitments and discusses applications.
2 Themodel without partial commitments
We first describe the model in the case when an endogenous timing game with observable
delay (Hamilton and Slutsky 1990) is played with perfect commitments, i.e. without the
possibility to renege on the announced strategy. Firms i = 1, 2 choose prices pi ∈ Pi ⊂
R
+∪{0} in a market with heterogenous goods and constant marginal costs of production. The
production technologies are stochastic and the marginal cost distributions are characterized by
means and variances. The mean of Firm i is E{ci } = c¯i and the variance is Var{ci } = σi ≥ 0.
We consider Firm 1 as a high cost producer and Firm 2 as a low cost producer, meaning that
c¯1 > c¯2. To simplify the ensuing analytical expressions, in the rest of the paper we scale
c¯2 = 0 without loss of generality, and assume c¯1 > 0. The prices are chosen before the firms
learn each others’ marginal costs, but the cost distributions are common knowledge. For each
ex-post level of marginal cost ci the profits for player i are
fi (p1, p2; ci ) = (pi − ci )Di (p1, p2) (1)
where the demand function is given by Di (p1, p2) = a − p1 + bp2, where a ∈ A ⊂ R+
and b ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R. The parameter a describes market demand and b describes product
heterogeneity.
The demand function is strictly log-supermodular and therefore the reaction functions are
nondecreasing and at least one firm has a second-mover advantage in a game where prices
p1, p2 are set and profits (1) follow (Amir and Stepanova 2006). We denote by game G(α) the
endogenous timing duopoly game where the firms decide upon their timings by announcing
α1, α2 ∈ {L, F} at Stage 0, where L means moving at Stage 1 (leader) and F moving at
Stage 2 (follower). Equilibrium prices depend on the ex-post values of the marginal costs
and are denoted by (pαii (ci ), p
α j
j (c j )).
The fact that the marginal costs are realized only after the pricing decisions means that the
solution concepts are Bayesian equilibria as in Albaek (1990). The timing announcements
fully characterize the four possible market outcomes in game G(α); this means that we can
denote the outcomes using the timing announcements. We denote an outcome by the 2-tuple
α = (α1, α2), where for example (L, F) means that Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the
follower and the equilibrium prices are (pL1 (c1), pF2 (c2)) and the ex-ante expected profits
are those of the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium. To further streamline notation we
denote the ex-ante expected equilibrium profits in G(α) by
Πi (α) ≡ Eci {Ec j { fi (pα11 (c1), pα22 (c2); ci )}}, i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
where Eci {·} is the expectation over ci . In the remainder of the article these are just referred
to as profits.
Amir and Stepanova (2006) show that with nonstochastic costs (σi = 0 for i = 1, 2) and
certain left-side restrictions on the demand parameter there are two sequential move equilibria
that Pareto dominate the simultaneous move equilibria. In what follows we show that this
also goes for the stochastic cost case under certain additional restrictions on the parameters
of the marginal cost distributions. We restrict the demand parameter from below such that (i)
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only such sequential move equilibria that Pareto dominate the simultaneous move equilibria
exist in game G(α) and that (ii) both firms have a second mover advantage in game G(α).
These restrictions are necessary conditions for G(α) to be a coordination game with two
non-Pareto ranked equilibria.
Before we formulate the equilibrium profits, we must restrict the interval A of feasible
demand parameters such that the equilibrium prices are not smaller than the costs.
Assumption 1 A  (− (b2−2)b+2 c¯1,∞).
Proposition 1 in Amir and Stepanova (2006) together with our Assumption 1 guarantees
that at least one of the firms prefers followership to any other outcome.
Lemma 1 Given that a ∈ A, the equilibrium prices in the simultaneous-move outcomes are
(pL1 (c1), p
L
2 (c2)) = (pF1 (c1), pF2 (c2))
=
(
2a(b + 2) + 4c1 + b2(−c1 + c¯1)
−2b2 + 8 ,
2a(b + 2) + 4c2 + b(−bc2 + 2c¯1)
−2b2 + 8
) (2)
and the corresponding profits,
Π1(L, L) = Π1(F, F) = (a(b + 2) + (b
2 − 2)c¯1)2
(b2 − 4)2 +
σ1
4
,
Π2(L, L) = Π2(F, F) = (a(b + 2) + bc¯1)
2
(b2 − 4)2 +
σ2
4
.
(3)
The equilibrium prices in the Stackelberg outcome with Firm i as the leader are
pFj (c j , p
L
i ) =
1
2
(a + bpLi + c j ),
pLi (ci ) =
a(b + 2) + 2ci + b(−bci + c¯ j )
−2b2 + 4 ,
(4)
for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and c¯2 = 0, and the corresponding profits with Firm 1 as the leader,
Π1(L, F) = (a(b + 2) + (b
2 − 2)c¯1)2
8(−b2 + 2) −
1
8
(b2 − 2)σ1,
Π2(L, F) = (a((b − 2)b − 4) + b(b
2 − 2)c¯1)2
16(b2 − 2)2 +
1
16
(b2σ1 + 4σ2),
(5)
and with Firm 1 as the follower
Π1(F, L) = (a((b − 2)b − 4) + (−3b
2 + 4)c¯1)2
16(b2 − 2)2 +
1
16
(b2σ2 + 4σ1),
Π2(F, L) = (a(b + 2) + bc¯1)
2
8(−b2 + 2) −
1
8
(b2 − 2)σ2.
(6)
Proof In this class of linear-quadratic models the unique Bertrand equilibrium prices are
linear in the private cost information (Vives 1999), pˆ j (c j ) ≡ β j + γ j c j , j = i . The first-
order condition for Firm i for a specific level of own cost ci and the conjectured Firm j’s
price pˆ j (c j ) is
∂
∂ pi
fi (pi , pˆ j (c j ); ci ) = 0, i = j, (7)
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from which we solve the ex-ante expected price candidate
pi (ci ) = 12 (a + ci + bEc j { pˆ j (c j )}). (8)
Assuming that Firm j does the same calculation we can see that the conjectured coefficient
γi = γ j = 12 . The expected value of pˆ j (c j ) is therefore Ec j { pˆ j (c j )} = β j + 12 c¯ j . This can
be substituted to (8) to get two equations for i = 1, 2, i = j ,
βi + 12 ci =
1
2
(
a + ci + b
(
β j + 12 c¯ j
))
,
from which we solve
βi = β j = 4a + 2ab + b
2c¯i + 2bc¯ j
2(−b2 + 4)
for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and c¯2 = 0. From these calculations (2) and (3) follow.
To compute the Stackelberg equilibria we first assume that Firm j is the follower and
reacts with pˆ j (pi ; c j ) = 12 (a + c j + bpi ). Firm i as the leader optimizes its price against
this and the ex-ante expected prices are (4) and the corresponding ex-ante expected profits
with Firm 1 as the leader are (5). (6) are obtained similarly. 	unionsq
Next we restrict the parameters of the marginal cost distributions so that each firm prefers
the sequential move outcomes over the simultaneous move outcomes and that each firm
prefers followership to leadership. This first calls for obtaining a suitable subinterval of A
for the demand parameter a. From the profits given in (3), (5), and (6) we can see that they
are upwards-opening quadratic functions in a and therefore above a certain point in A the
outcomes are Pareto-ranked.
Corollary 1 There is a point in the interval A above which the profits are ordered Π1(F, L) >
Π1(L, F) > Π1(L, L) = Π1(F, F) and Π2(L, F) > Π2(F, L) > Π2(L, L) = Π2(F, F).
Proof Each profit expression in Lemma 1 is a second-degree polynomial in a. The second-
degree coefficients of a of each of the Firm 1’s profits Π1(F, L), Π1(L, F), and Π1(F, F)
(or Π1(L, L)) are strictly positive and given and ordered by
((b − 2)b − 4)2
16(b2 − 2)2 >
(b + 2)2
8(−b2 + 2) >
1
(b − 2)2 ,
respectively for all feasible values of b. The comparison can be similarly conducted for Firm
2’s profits. This implies that the curvatures of the upwards-opening quadratics are ordered
as such and there is the sought after point in the positive a-axis. 	unionsq
Corollary 1 shows that there is an open subinterval A1 ⊂ A where both firms’ follower
profits exceed leader profits and leader profits exceed those from the simultaneous-move
equilibria.1 This is the subinterval to which we restrict a in the remainder of the article.
Assumption 2 states the infimum of this subinterval.
1 Unlike Amir and Stepanova (2006), we do not consider the other subinterval of A in which Firm 2 prefers
leadership to followership. The reason for this is that as we have uncertain costs, it could be that for values of
a < a1 Firm 1 too could have this preference.
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Assumption 2 a > a = max{a1, a2}, where
a1 = (−2b
5 − b4 + 2b3)c¯1
b3(3b + 4) +
(−b2 + 2)
b3(3b + 4)
×
√
b5
(
2b(b + 1)2c¯21 + 2(3b + 4)(b2 − 2)σ1 + (3b + 4)(b2 − 2)σ2
)
−b2 + 2 ,
a2 = − bc¯1b + 2 +
b2σ2√
b6σ2/
(
(b − 2)2(−b2 + 2)) .
For σ2 = 0, a2 = −bc¯1/(b + 2).
The point a1 in Assumption 2 is found by comparing Firm 1’s leader and simultaneous
play profits and Firm 2’s follower and leader profits. The value of a where the latter profits
are equal is always smaller than a0. Thus, a1 is the value of a where Firm 1’s leader profit
equals its simultaneous play profit. The point a2 is found by equating Firm 2’s follower
and leader profits. Straightforward profit comparisons show that all the other possibilities lie
below these values, including the point a0.
Assumption 3 c¯1 must satisfy
c¯1 ≥
√
(b + 2)2(−b2 + 2)(σ1 + 2σ2)
2b2(b + 1)2 .
The restriction in Assumption 3 is found by calculating the range of c¯1 that satisfies the
inequality a0 ≤ max{a1, a2}. It can also be shown that the same restriction forces the term
inside the square-root in a1 to be strictly positive. Assumption 3 implies that the lower limit
of the mean of Firm 1’s marginal cost increases as the variances increase either separately or
together. The effect of Firm 2’s variance on this is higher than Firm 1’s variance.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1–3, the sequential-move equilibria of game G(α) Pareto
dominate the simultaneous move equilibria:
Πi (L, F) > Πi (L, L), Πi (L, F) > Πi (F, F),
Πi (F, L) > Πi (L, L), Πi (F, L) > Πi (F, F)
for i = 1, 2. Furthermore, under Assumptions 2 and 3, both firms have a second mover
advantage in G:
Π1(F, L) > Π1(L, F), Π2(L, F) > Π2(F, L).
Proof Trivially results from Lemma 1, Assumptions 1–3 and Corollary 1. 	unionsq
3 Themodel with partial commitments
We now relax the full commitments in game G(α) by formulating an “extended game”
G˜(α, t) in which a decision stage is added between stages 0 and 1. In this new stage, the
firms can decide whether they wish to renege on the commitments α that they made on stage
0 by announcing their timings. Let this stage be called the “0.5th stage”, and let t = (t1, t2)
denote the 2-tuple that determines the firms’ timing decisions similarly as α. The timing
decisions are made simultaneously. Both firms as well as the demand side of the market
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observes the 0-Stage announcements perfectly before stage 0.5 is played. The outcomes in
the actual duopoly game are then determined on the basis of the timing decisions. If Firm i
reneges on its announcement, it has to pay a deviation cost ki ∈ R+. The deviation cost is
introduced to the profits in G˜(α, t) such that for i = 1, 2 the profit is
Π˜i (αi ; t) = Πi (t) − κ(αi , ti )
where
κ(αi , ti ) =
{
0, ti = αi ,
ki , ti = αi .
The conduct of G˜(α, t) is as follows:
Stage 0: The following events take place in the given order
– Nature reveals ci to Firm i
– The firms choose α
Stage 0.5: The firms choose t
Stage 1: The leader moves
Stage 2: The follower moves
Proposition 1 Assume that c¯1 is restricted below as in Assumption 3 and that at least one of
the variances σ1 or σ2 is nonzero. Assume also that ki = 0 for i = 1, 2. Then,
– if k1 > k1 and k2 ≤ k2, G˜(α, t) has a unique SPE given by α = (F, L) and t = (F, L);
– if k1 ≤ k1 and k2 > k2, G˜(α, t) has a unique SPE given by α = (L, F) and t = (L, F);
where
k1 =
b4(a(b + 2) + (b2 − 2)c¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) −
b2σ1
8
,
k2 =
b4(a(b + 2) + bc¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) −
b2σ2
8
.
(9)
Proof We shall first formulate two conditions for the existence of the two SPE’s. These are
then shown to be the conditions that guarantee uniqueness.
Condition 1: 5˜1((F, ˛2), (L, F)) < 5˜1((F, ˛2), (F, F)),˛2 = L, F
This means that
Π1(L, F) − k1 < Π1(F, F) ⇒ k1 > Π1(L, F) − Π1(F, F).
This gives k1.
Condition 2: 5˜2((˛1, L), (F, F)) < 5˜2((˛1, F), (F, F)),˛1 = L, F
This means that
Π2(F, L) − k2 < Π2(F, F) ⇒ k2 > Π2(F, L) − Π2(F, F).
This gives k2.
G˜(α, t) is presented below in normal form. Each quadrant (numbered I–IV) corresponds
to a subgame that starts when both firms observe the announcements α. If there is a unique
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SPE in the game, then iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies leaves only one
outcome in only one of the quadrants, and this is the unique NE of that subgame. To show
that the SPE’s are unique when ki > ki but k j ≤ k j , i, j = 1, 2, i = j , we shall inspect
each case separately.
α2 = αL 2 = F
t1 = L t1 = F t1 = L t1 = F
t2 = L
Π1(L,L) Π1(F,L) − k1 Π1(L, L) Π1(F,L) − k1
Π2(L,L) Π2(F,L) Π2(L, L) − k2 Π2(F,L) − k2
α1 = L I II
t2 = F
Π1(L, F ) Π1(F,F ) − k1 Π1(L,F ) Π1(F,F ) − k1
Π2(L,F ) − k2 Π2(F,F ) − k2 Π2(L,F ) Π2(F,F )
t2 = L
Π1(L, L) − k1 Π1(F,L) Π1(L, L) − k1 Π1(F,L)
Π2(L,L) Π2(F,L) Π2(L, L) − k2 Π2(F,L) − k2
α1 = F III IV
t2 = F
Π1(L,F ) − k1 Π1(F, F ) Π1(L, F )− k1 Π1(F,F )
Π2(L,F ) − k2 Π2(F,F ) − k2 Π2(L,F ) Π2(F,F )
Case 1: k1 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ k2
In this case Π1(L, F) − k1 > Π1(F, F) and Π2(F, L) − k2 > Π2(F, F) and there are two
Nash equilibria in nondominated strategies in each quadrant. In all of these NE’s the firms
move sequentially. The cases k1 = 0, k2 = 0 and k1 = k2 = 0 do not form exceptions.
Case 2: k1 > k1, k2 ≤ k2
In this case Π1(L, F)−k1 < Π1(F, F) from which it follows that t1 = F strictly dominates
t1 = L in quadrants III and IV but not in quadrants I and II. Because Π2(F, L) − k2 >
Π2(F, F), there is one NE in each quadrant III and IV, among which α2 = L strictly
dominates α2 = F given that k2 = 0. Therefore, the SPE with (α, t) = ((F, L), (F, L)),
guaranteed by Condition 1, is unique.
Case 3: k1 ≤ k1, k2 > k2
In this case Π2(F, L)−k2 < Π2(F, F) from which it follows that t2 = F strictly dominates
t2 = L in quadrants II and IV but not in quadrants I and III. Because Π1(L, F) − k1 >
Π1(F, F), there is one NE in each quadrant II and IV, among which α1 = L strictly dominates
α1 = F given that k1 = 0. Therefore, the SPE with (α, t) = ((L, F), (L, F)), guaranteed
by Condition 2, is unique.
Case 4: k1 > k1, k2 > k2
In this case Π1(L, F) − k1 < Π1(F, F) and Π2(F, L) − k2 < Π2(F, F) and again there
are two Nash equilibria in nondominated strategies in each quadrant. Therefore, the SPE’s
cannot be unique. 	unionsq
Proposition 1 thus gives two possibilities for the SPEs to be unique, depending on the
relative size of the deviation costs. In each unique SPE either the low cost or the high
cost firm enjoys the second mover advantage. It should be noted that the restrictions that
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Proposition 1 places on the deviation costs depend on the asymmetry in the stochastic costs.
Uniqueness as laid out in either case of Proposition 1 is guaranteed if our initial assumption
c¯1 > 0 holds, because then k1 = k2, forcing either case in Proposition 1 to hold.
To get a better idea of how a partial commitment might work in G˜(α, t), we may look
at the situation when a suitably chosen common deviation cost k = k1 = k2 is in place. In
this situation, the high cost Firm 1 can make a cheaper partial commitment than the low cost
Firm 2 and become the follower, as Corollary 2 below shows.
Corollary 2 If the deviation cost is exogenously given and common to both firms, k = k1 = k2,
then there exists such a k for which k1 < k ≤ k2 that guarantees a unique SPE where Firm
1 is the follower and Firm 2 the leader.
Proof We show that from the condition c¯1 > 0 it follows that k1 < k2. Note that for c¯1 = 0,
k2 < k1 if 18 b
2(σ1 −σ2) < 0 which is satisfied for σ2 < σ1. Therefore, c¯1 = 0 cannot satisfy
the Corollary. Then for c¯1 > 0 we see that
k2 − k1 =
ab4(b + 1)
4(b4 − 6b2 + 8) c¯1 +
b4(b2 − 1)
8(b4 − 6b2 + 8) c¯
2
1 +
b2σ1
8
− b
2σ2
8
which is clearly above zero for all c¯1 that satisfy Assumption 3, i.e. for
c¯1 ≥
√
(b + 2)2(−b2 + 2)(σ1 + 2σ2)
2b2(b + 1)2 . 	unionsq
We also find that in a situation where k j = 0 < k j and ki > ki , there are “babbling”
equilibria where Firm j’s announcement is not informative of its intentions on the equilibrium
path. This is because if Firm j does not have to pay a deviation cost, it is indifferent about
which announcement it makes.
4 Information sharing
Because our model has stochastic production technologies, a situation may occur where a firm
learns its own marginal cost before it makes the timing decision. For example, a manufacturer
may learn the exact marginal cost by conducting production test runs. Likewise there may
be costs related to e.g. staff training with a novel business model that are privately learned
before business is opened. Would the firm in such a situation have the incentive to share this
private information with the competitor, in order to obtain a favorable outcome for itself in
the game?
This “private values” problem has been previously analyzed in games with full commit-
ment, see e.g. Vives (1984) and Raith (1996). Gal-Or (1986) shows that in simultaneous-move
Bertrand markets with private marginal costs, firms conceal rather than share their private cost
information. However, in our case the decision to share with the competitor the private cost
does not trivially depend on the leader/follower role assignment, as this is decided endoge-
nously via the announcements. The firms must also consider what implications information
sharing has on the profitability of the timing sequence that ensues. Rather than having a
direct effect on pricing behavior, information sharing has a direct effect on the (partial)
commitments that the firms make at the 0th stage of the game.
In Sect. 3 we showed how the SPEs (α, t)=((F, L), (F, L)) and (α, t) = ((L, F), (L, F))
of game G˜(α, t) depend on the values of the deviation costs k1 and k2. It was shown that if ki
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is greater than ki but k j equal to or less than k j , then in the unique SPE Firm i is the follower
and Firm j is the leader, i, j = 1, 2, i = j . However, as we assumed that no information was
shared in Sect. 3, these results have to be reconsidered under the four different information
sharing conditions, which are both conceal, one firm shares while the other conceals (and
vice versa), and both share their private marginal costs. Lemma 3 establishes profits when
information sharing is bilateral or unilateral, and these profits are then used in a reformulation
of the results obtained in Sect. 3.
In this section we consider the implications of information sharing for the results obtained
in the previous section. If the firms decide to share their private information, this happens
before any decision making takes place and they are assumed to do so with perfect precision,
e.g. via a trade association using industry-wide contracts (as in Vives 1984 and Shapiro
1986). Furthermore, firms make the decision to share before they learn their costs (as in Raith
1996). Therefore we abstain from building a model where information sharing is strategic,
i.e. we do not consider a signaling model in the sense of the signaling literature such as
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) where actions convey inferential impacts. The purpose of this
section is to complement the literature on information sharing in oligopoly games (Raith
1996) with a consideration of partial commitments. A sizeable literature exists on signaling
asymmetric information in endogenous timing games, see e.g. Daughety and Reinganum
(1994), Normann (1997), and Brindisi et al. (2014).
To simplify the analyses, we first define the certainty equivalence profits that are profits of
the game when the cost variances are zero. We then define the different outcomes that result
when both firms share and when only one firm shares the private cost information.
Lemma 3 The “certainty equivalence profits”, i.e. the profit expressions with zero variances,
are given by
ΠC E1 (L, F) =
(a(b + 2) + (b2 − 2)c¯1)2
8(−b2 + 2) ,
ΠC E2 (L, F) =
(a((b − 2)b − 4) + b(b2 − 2)c¯1)2
16(b2 − 2)2 ,
ΠC E1 (F, L) =
(a((b − 2)b − 4) + (−3b2 + 4)c¯1)2
16(b2 − 2)2 ,
ΠC E2 (F, L) =
(a(b + 2) + bc¯1)2
8(−b2 + 2) ,
ΠC E1 (F, F) =
(a(b + 2) + (b2 − 2)c¯1)2
(b2 − 4)2 ,
ΠC E2 (F, F) =
(a(b + 2) + bc¯1)2
(b2 − 4)2 .
When both firms share c1, c2, the profits are:
Π
1&2,sh
1 (L, F) = ΠC E1 (L, F) +
(b2 − 2)2σ1 + b2σ2
8(−b2 + 2)
Π
1&2,sh
2 (L, F) = ΠC E2 (L, F) +
1
16
(
b2σ1 +
(−3b2 + 4
b2 − 2
)2
σ2
)
Π
1&2,sh
1 (F, L) = ΠC E1 (F, L) +
1
16
((−3b2 + 4
b2 − 2
)2
σ1 + b2σ2
)
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Π
1&2,sh
2 (F, L) = ΠC E2 (F, L) +
b2σ1
−8b2 + 16 +
1
8
(−b2 + 2)σ2
Π
1&2,sh
1 (F, F) = ΠC E1 (F, F) +
(b2 − 2)2σ1 + b2σ2
(b2 − 4)2
Π
1&2,sh
2 (F, F) = ΠC E2 (F, F) +
b2σ1 + (b2 − 2)2σ2
(b2 − 4)2
When Firm 1 shares c1 but Firm 2 conceals c2, the profits are:
Π
1,sh
1 (L, F) = ΠC E1 (L, F) +
1
8
(−b2 + 2)σ1
Π
1,sh
2 (L, F) = ΠC E2 (L, F) +
b2σ1
16
+ σ2
4
Π
1,sh
1 (F, L) = ΠC E1 (F, L) +
1
16
((−3b2 + 4
b2 − 2
)2
σ1 + b2σ2
)
Π
1,sh
2 (F, L) = ΠC E2 (F, L) +
b2σ1
8(−b2 + 2) +
1
8
(−b2 + 2)σ2
Π
1,sh
1 (F, F) = ΠC E1 (F, F) +
(
b2 − 2
b2 − 4
)2
σ1
Π
1,sh
2 (F, F) = ΠC E2 (F, F) +
b2σ1
(b2 − 4)2 +
σ2
4
When Firm 1 conceals c1 but Firm 2 shares c2, the profits are:
Π
2,sh
1 (L, F) = ΠC E1 (L, F) +
1
8
(−b2 + 2)σ1 + b
2σ2
8(−b2 + 2)
Π
2,sh
2 (L, F) = ΠC E2 (L, F) +
1
16
(
b2σ1 +
(−3b2 + 4
b2 − 2
)2
σ2
)
Π
2,sh
1 (F, L) = ΠC E1 (F, L) +
σ1
4
+ b
2σ2
16
Π
2,sh
2 (F, L) = ΠC E2 (F, L) +
1
8
(−b2 + 2)σ2
Π
2,sh
1 (F, F) = ΠC E1 (F, F) +
σ1
4
+ b
2σ2
(b2 − 4)2
Π
2,sh
2 (F, F) = ΠC E2 (F, F) +
(
b2 − 2
b2 − 4
)2
σ2
The profits are ordered as follows:
Π
1,sh
1 (F, F) < Π1(F, F) < Π
1&2,sh
1 (F, F) < Π
2,sh
1 (F, F),
Π
1,sh
1 (L, F) = Π1(L, F) < Π1&2,sh1 (L, F) = Π2,sh1 (L, F),
Π
1,sh
1 (F, L) = Π1&2,sh1 (F, L) < Π1(F, L) = Π2,sh1 (F, L),
Π
2,sh
2 (F, F) < Π
1&2,sh
2 (F, F) < Π2(F, F) < Π
1,sh
2 (F, F),
Π
2,sh
2 (F, L) = Π2(F, L) < Π1&2,sh2 (F, L) = Π1,sh2 (F, L),
Π
2,sh
2 (L, F) = Π1&2,sh2 (L, F) < Π2(L, F) = Π1,sh2 (L, F).
(10)
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Proof When Firm i shares ci to Firm j , the latter does not act upon the expected price
Ec j {pi (ci )} as in Lemma 1 but with the actual cost information. This fact is used to derive
the payoffs in the different situations. 	unionsq
Corollary 3 Let ki,shi , k
j,sh
i , and k
i& j,sh
i denote the lower limits of the deviation cost sets
(as in Proposition 1) in the different information sharing conditions (i shares unilaterally, j
shares unilaterally, i& j share, respectively). The upper limits of these sets extend to infinity.
Then the lower limits are ordered such that
k1 < k
2,sh
1 < k
1,sh
1 < k
1&2,sh
1 < k2 < k
1,sh
2 < k
2,sh
2 < k
1&2,sh
2 (11)
where k1, k2 are as given in Proposition 1.
Proof The lower limits of the deviation cost sets are calculated as in Conditions 1 and 2 of
the Proof of Proposition 1. They are:
k2,sh1 =
b4(a(b + 2) + (b2 − 2)c¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) −
b2σ1
8
+ b
6σ2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) ,
k1,sh1 =
b4(a(b + 2) + (b2 − 2)c¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) +
b4(−b2 + 2)σ1
8(b2 − 4)2 ,
k1&2,sh1 =
b4(a(b + 2) + (b2 − 2)c¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) +
b4(−b2 + 2)σ1
8(b2 − 4)2 +
b6σ2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) ,
and
k1,sh2 =
b4(a(b + 2) + bc¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) +
b6σ1
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) −
b2σ2
8
k2,sh2 =
b4(a(b + 2) + bc¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) +
b4(−b2 + 2)σ2
8(b2 − 4)2
k1&2,sh2 =
b4(a(b + 2) + bc¯1)2
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) +
b6σ1
8(b2 − 4)2(−b2 + 2) +
b4(−b2 + 2)σ2
8(b2 − 4)2 .
It is straightforward to check, by comparing the variance terms and taking into account
Assumption 3, that the ordering (11) holds. 	unionsq
Corollary 3 suggests that information sharing places more stringent criteria for the devi-
ation cost than information concealment: The firms will not consider information sharing if
the deviation cost is close to the lower boundary of their deviation cost sets. Therefore, Propo-
sition 1 does not sufficiently describe the conditions for the unique SPE when information is
shared unilaterally or bilaterally.
Proposition 2 Let us assume that the deviation costs are common to both firms, k = k1 = k2.
If the firms can decide whether they share their private cost information or not before they
make announcements in game G˜(α, t), then the unique SPE where Firm 1 is the follower and
Firm 2 is the leader exists for k1 < k ≤ k2. In this SPE neither firm shares its private cost
information.
Proof When information is not shared, a unique SPE in G˜(α, t) exists if the common deviation
cost k1 < k ≤ k2 (Proposition 1). However, given the various possibilities for information
sharing conditions we should consider the deviation cost sets given in Corollary 3 that extend
the interval (k1, k2]. Equations (10) in Lemma 3 show that Firm 1 prefers concealing infor-
mation to own unilateral sharing or bilateral sharing. Therefore values k ∈ (k2, k1&2,sh2 ] are
not feasible because k1,sh2 < k
2,sh
2 < k
1&2,sh
2 (Corollary 3). 	unionsq
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Proposition 2 states that if the firms have a common deviation cost, neither firm shares
their private marginal cost information in the unique SPE if the deviation cost is above the
lower limit of Firm 1’s deviation cost set but below that of Firm 2. Therefore, the equilibrium
selection implications of Sect. 3 are preserved for the case where private cost information
can be learned.
5 Discussion
The deviation cost ki can be thought of as a cost of a lost opportunity that is imposed if
the move that is announced is reneged on. Such opportunities arise frequently as a result of
advertising campaigns where firms aim to increase their brand value.2
Think of two price-setting firms who are about to open business at a new location, such as
the restaurant chains in the motivating example of Sect. 1. They have fairly similar product
portfolios and they face a coordination dilemma in the form of that described in Sect. 2, i.e.
they prefer to open at different dates instead of opening at the same date. To inform customers,
the firms advertise their opening date at the local media and face reputational damage or the
loss of loyal customers if they renege on their announced date. Assume therefore that the
deviation cost ki = β + γi , where γi is the cost that incurs from reputational loss and β is
a fine imposed by a third party from a contractual breach. Assume further that γi = γi (yi )
is increasing in a campaign investment yi . According to our analysis in Sect. 3, the low cost
Firm 2 must make a higher campaign investment than Firm 1 to become the follower, i.e.
γ2(y2) + β > γ1(y1) + β. However, Firm 2’s investment leads to its followership only if
γ2(y2) + β > k2 but γ1(y1) + β ≤ k1. This problem can also be solved by the third party—
e.g. a facility owner that stands on the other side of the contract—by adjusting β such that
the deviation cost is within the interval (k1, k2]. In this case only the timing structure where
the high cost Firm 1 becomes the follower is viable.
5.1 Related literature
Caruana and Einav (2008) study a model of partial commitments that allows repeated and
sequential adjustments of announcements at a switching cost that increases after every adjust-
ment before the final commitments. Their model is generic and can explain a host of situations
involving costly delays, such as sequential market entry. On the other hand, their model does
not answer to the questions that we study, namely which of the asymmetric cost firms affords
a more costly commitment and how cost uncertainty affects partial commitments. In princi-
ple our model could also allow for multiple rounds of timing announcements αi before the
final timings t are decided upon. This would require that Firm i at announcement round r
observes Firm j’s announcement at the previous round r − 1, denoted αr−1j , before making
its own announcement αri , assuming that r ∈ {2, 3, . . .} and i = j . Because of the nature
of the pricing game that we consider, we would have αri = αr−1j for each r (this is implied
by Lemma 2). If we assume that the deviation cost increases from one round to the next and
that the increase in the deviation cost between rounds is not larger than the interval (k1, k2],
i.e. k2 − k1 > κr (αi , ti ) − κr−1(αi , ti ) > 0, we would observe essentially the same result
as given in Proposition 1. This result would say that the high cost Firm 1 stops switching
announcements when the deviation cost hits the lower bound k1. After this the low cost
2 Advertising has extensively been studied in coordination games, see e.g. Bagwell and Ramey (1994).
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Firm 2 would also not have reason to switch from the announcement given that αr−12 = αr1.
Therefore, such an assumption of sequential announcements would not be restrictive to our
results.
Henkel (2002) and Weber (2014) consider partial commitments in duopoly with exogenous
timing. In their models the leader deviates from its announced strategy after the follower has
decided. With increasing reaction functions this gives the leader a partial commitment for
moderate deviation cost levels. We should therefore compare our model to these models
and ask: Does the partial commitment to price, rather than to timing as in Sect. 3, yield a
unique SPE in G(α)? The answer is no—this is because we do not consider deviations from
followership or simultaneous play. As a result the coordination problem between multiple
SPEs persists for any deviation cost level. The argument is as follows. First consider the
subgame α = (L, F). In this case Firm 1 deviates from pL1 to R(p2), where R(p2) is the
argmax of its ex-ante expected profit function given Firm 2’s price p2, and pays a deviation
cost li ∈ (0,∞). Firm 2 takes this deviation into account and prices at p2 = pL2 and Firm
1 enjoys a profit that is maximal at zero deviation cost, which is then the follower payoff.
Hence, for small deviation costs there are two Nash equilibria in nondominated strategies in
this subgame and as the deviation cost li increases, Firm 1’s deviation becomes dominated by
non-deviation. Then repeat these arguments for the subgame α = (F, L) with the players’
roles reversed. Even if we consider all deviation cost levels from zero to infinity there are
always two SPE’s in this game, one in each subgame.
Amir and Stepanova (2006) present a risk dominance argument in the pricing game with
full commitments and nonstochastic costs. If the firms are interested in minimizing the risk of
a coordination failure, they will naturally want coordinate on the equilibrium that has a larger
product of deviation losses. It can be easily shown that, as in Amir and Stepanova (2006),
in game G(α) presented in Sect. 2 of this article the equilibrium α = (F, L) risk dominates
the equilibrium α = (L, F) regardless of the variance levels (as long as Assumptions 1–3
are satisfied). However, as Amir and Stepanova (2006) note, the concept of risk dominance
is applicable only to the 2 × 2 game with announcements and not the actual duopoly game
where firms decide upon the continuous price levels. It is therefore ambiguous how the firms
would actually apply the risk dominance concept. We present one way to endogenize the
selection of one of two possible sequential move equilibria in the HS game with observable
delay that also complements the arguments offered by risk dominance considerations.
5.2 Related applications
Various applications in the oligopoly literature bear resemblance to partial commitments
described in this article and in Henkel (2002) and Weber (2014). While constructing a unifying
framework of the economic models of partial commitments is out of scope for this paper,
it is illustrative to discuss selected examples. Cooper (1986) studies most-favored customer
pricing and finds that a unilateral promise of rebates to current customers in case of a future
price cut works as a commitment device to a price that is above a Nash equilibrium and thus
facilitates collusion.
Side payments are used in economic contracting to reduce externalities and this in general
is seen as enhancing efficiency. However, as Jackson and Wilkie (2005) find, strategic use
of side payments may not always increase efficiency, because the player offering the side
payment aims to alter the other’s behavior to its own advantage rather than to increase
efficiency. In this sense strategy contingent side payments resemble partial commitments.
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Sunk costs can be seen as commitment devices when market entry is considered, and not
only as entry barriers that modify the pre-entry conditions as in the classical entry literature
(e.g. Dixit, 1980). As in the side payments case, the sunk costs can alter both players’ behavior.
Cabral and Ross (2008) present a model where the entrant’s sunk investment softens the
incumbent who would otherwise resort to predatory behavior. The sunk investment commits
the entrant by making its exit unattractive.
The Bertrand model with homogenous products can be applied to model procurement
auctions with supply-side competition. Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) note that
sequential price competition arises in procurement auctions when one of the firms has a right
of first refusal, i.e. the option to observe the other’s price before submitting own price. Our
model could be extended to allow homogenous products and the possibility of bidding for
this right—creating a partial commitment—could be explicitly modeled. The option value
of partial commitments should provide avenues for future research.
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